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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Justin Studer pled guilty to one count of possession of
methamphetamine.  He received a unified sentence of seven years, with one and one-half years
fixed.
On appeal, Mr. Studer contends that this sentence represents an abuse of the district
court’s discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the facts.  He further contends that the
district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce his sentence in light of the additional
information submitted in conjunction with his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35)
motion.
2Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On January 31, 2016, officers responded to a report of suspicious activity near a
residence.  (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI),  p.2.)   Officers  arrived  and
observed two men standing in front of a parked vehicle with the hood up.  (PSI, p.3.)  A man,
later identified as Jason Studer, was in front of the vehicle with his hand on the opened hood
while the other man, identified as Daniel Hernandez, was on the passenger side with the door
open.  (PSI, p.3.)  The vehicle’s license plates were checked with dispatch, and the vehicle
returned as stolen.  (PSI, p.3.)  Both men were handcuffed and, as an officer pat-searched
Mr. Studer, he asked Mr. Studer’s consent to go through his pockets.  (PSI, p.3.)  Mr. Studer
consented, and the officer located a bag containing a substance which tested presumptively
positive for methamphetamine.  (PSI, p.3.)
Based  on  these  facts,  Mr.  Studer  was  charged  by  information  with  one  count  of
possession of methamphetamine and a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.  (R., pp.18-
19, 44-47.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Studer pled guilty to possessing
methamphetamine.  (6/29/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.3-16; R., pp.61-69.)  As a condition of the plea
agreement,  Mr.  Studer  agreed  to  pay  restitution  on  the  stolen  vehicle  whose  hood  he  was
touching when the officers arrived.  (6/29/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.16-20; R., p.65.)  In exchange, the State
agreed to dismiss the persistent violator enhancement and not to file grand theft charges.
(6/29/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-20; R., p.63.)  There was no agreement as to sentencing
recommendations.  (6/29/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-15; R., p.63.)
At the sentencing hearing, the State asked the district court to sentence Mr. Studer to a
unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed.  (8/29/16 Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.)  Mr. Studer’s
3counsel asked the district court to place Mr. Studer on probation.  (8/29/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.10-12,
p.9, Ls.14-15.)
 Mr. Studer was sentenced to seven years, with one and one-half years fixed.  (8/29/16
Tr., p.17, Ls.18-20; R., pp.82, 101-102.)  Mr. Studer timely filed an objection to restitution and a
supporting memorandum.  (R., pp.84-85, 156-160.)  Although several restitution hearings were
held, defense counsel later withdrew Mr. Studer’s objection to the restitution order.  (R., pp.161-
167; Augmentation, pp.8-32.)
Mr. Studer then filed a timely Rule 35 motion asking the district court to reconsider the
sentence.  (R., pp.123-125.)  The district court allowed Mr. Studer additional time to file
supplemental materials in support of his Rule 35 motion.  (R., p.148.)  On January 29, 2013, the
district court denied Mr. Studer’s Rule 35 motion without a hearing.  (R., pp.61-67.)  On
October 17, 2016, Mr. Studer filed a pro se notice  of  appeal  timely  from  the  judgment  of
conviction and the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion.1  (R., pp.126-130, 171-175.)
ISSUES
1. Did  the  district  court  abuse  its  discretion  when  it  imposed  a  unified  sentence  of  seven
years, with one and one-half years fixed, upon Mr. Studer following his plea of guilty to
possession of methamphetamine?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Studer’s Idaho Criminal
Rule 35 Motion?
1 The Idaho Supreme Court reinstated Mr. Studer’s appeal on December 16, 2016, after
Mr. Studer submitted additional information confirming that his appeal from the judgment of
conviction was timely pursuant to the prison mailbox rule.  (R., p.170.)
4ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Seven Years,
With One And One-Half Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Studer Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Possession of Methamphetamine
Mr. Studer asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of seven years,
with one and one-half years fixed, is excessive.  Where a defendant contends that the sentencing
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the
offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App.
1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)).  Mr. Studer does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Studer must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentences were excessive considering any view of the facts. Id.  The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:  (1) protection of society; (2)
deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Studer’s sentence is excessive
considering any view of the facts.
Mr. Studer is only 33 years old, but he has long struggled with an addiction to
methamphetamine.  (PSI, pp.1, 14-15.)  Although Mr. Studer did not begin using
5methamphetamine until he was nineteen years old, his methamphetamine use caused all of his
violations when he was on supervision and is the reason for this offense.  (PSI, p.14.)  Mr. Studer
first used methamphetamine with his biological mother.  (PSI, pp.11, 14.)
The  Idaho  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  substance  abuse  should  be  considered  as  a
mitigating factor by the district court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho
89 (1982).  In Nice, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior
record and the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s
alcoholic problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested
alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91.  Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has
ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate the
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance.  State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho 405, 414
(1981).  Mr. Studer realizes that his methamphetamine addiction is a problem area in his life, and
he wants help to stop using drugs.  (6/29/16 Tr., p.33, Ls.10-12; PSI, p.14.)  He would like to
stop using drugs because he would like to “know what it is like to be normal.”  (PSI, p.14.)
Further, Mr. Studer has been diagnosed with ADHD, depression, anxiety, and bipolar
disorder.  (PSI, pp.13-14.)  He also has a learning disability.  (PSI, p.12.)  Mr. Studer has
received SSI and SSD since he was six years old due to his mental health conditions.  (8/29/16
Tr., p.7, Ls.22-24; PSI, pp.11, 13.)  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the trial court must
consider a defendant’s mental illness as a factor at sentencing. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573,
581 (1999).
Mr. Studer does have a supportive family to assist him in his rehabilitation.  He has a new
girlfriend who does not use methamphetamine, and she had just had Mr. Studer’s child two
weeks before sentencing.  (8/29/16 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-11; PSI, p.12.)  Mr. Studer asked for probation
6so that he could be there to raise and support his newborn son.  (8/29/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.4-24; PSI,
pp.10, 15.)  Mr. Studer’s goals include being a good father.  (PSI, p.15.)  Mr. Studer’s newfound
determination to succeed in the community was evidenced in his pre-sentencing release—he did
not commit any new crimes and demonstrated that he could make it on probation.  (8/29/16
Tr., p.9, L.23 – p.10, L.5.)
Further, Mr. Studer expressed remorse and accepted responsibility for his actions.  (PSI,
p.4; 6/29/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.3-16.)  Mr. Studer wanted the court to know that he was disappointed
in himself.  (PSI, p.4.)  At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Studer apologized for his actions.
(8/29/16 Tr., p.12, L.2.)  He told the court:
It’s  hard  with  my  parents  here.   I  didn’t  expect  them.   I’d  like  to  apologize  to
them.  I’m really trying something different.  I know I need a lot of help.  As far
as probation, I need to be intense[ly] supervised.  I seem to fall off if I fall into the
wrong situations, put myself in bad situations, if that.  I know my past history
speaks for itself.  But I’m – I never thought I would be a father, and I’m a father
now.
(8/29/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.3-10.)  Idaho recognizes that some leniency is required when a defendant
expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts responsibility for his acts. Shideler, 103 Idaho at
595; State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
The issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has been
addressed in several cases.  For example, in Alberts, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some
leniency is required when the defendant has expressed “remorse for his conduct, his recognition
of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character.”
Alberts, 124 Idaho at 209.
The Idaho Supreme Court has also reduced a defendant’s term of imprisonment because
the defendant expressed regret for what he had done. Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.  In Shideler,
the Idaho Supreme Court ruled that the prospect of Shideler’s recovery from his poor mental and
7physical health, which included mood swings, violent outbursts, and drug abuse, coupled with
his  remorse  for  his  actions,  was  so  compelling  that  it  outweighed  the  gravity  of  the  crimes  of
armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission
of a crime. Id. at 594-95.  Therefore, the Court reduced Shideler’s sentence from an
indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to exceed twelve
years. Id. at 593.
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Studer asserts that the district court abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him.  He asserts that had the district court
properly considered his remorse, family support, and substance abuse/addiction it would have
imposed a less severe sentence.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Studer’s Rule 35 Motion For A
Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His Rule 35
Motion
 Although Mr. Studer contends that his sentence is excessive in light of the information in
front of the district court at the time of his August 29, 2016 sentencing hearing (see Part I,
supra), he asserts that the excessiveness of his sentence is even more apparent in light of the new
information submitted in conjunction with Mr. Studer’s Rule 35 motion.  Mr. Studer asserts that
the district court’s denial of his motion for a sentence modification represents an abuse of
discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994).  “The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are the same as those
8applied in determining whether the original sentence was reasonable.” Id.  “If the sentence was
not  excessive  when  pronounced,  the  defendant  must  later  show  that  it  is  excessive  in  view  of
new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction.  Id.
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Studer submitted information
regarding his family situation.  (R., p.124.)  Mr. Studer’s girlfriend and their baby boy need him.
(R., p.124.)  Further, Mr. Studer wants to be paroled to the State of Washington, where his
family will also reside.  (R., p.124.)  Mr. Studer is compliant on his mental health medications,
has benefitted from the medication, he has sought out counseling.  (R., p.124.)  Mr. Studer also
wanted  the  district  court  to  know  that  he  was  not  eligible  for  placement  at  the  Work  Center
because of prior convictions.  (R., p.124.)  Mr. Studer asked the court to reduce his sentence
from seven years, with one and one-half years fixed, to seven years, with one-half year, fixed.
(R., p.125.)  In light of Mr. Studer’s family situation and his progress in managing his mental
health conditions, the district court should have reduced his sentence.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district court at
the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing to reduce
Mr. Studer’s sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.
9CONCLUSION
Mr. Studer respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence
by one year or for whatever relief this Court deem appropriate.
DATED this 23rd day of June, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
10
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rd day of June, 2017, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing a copy thereof to be placed in the U.S.
Mail, addressed to:
JASON RAY STUDER
INMATE #69006
ISCI
PO BOX 14
BOISE ID 83707
JUNEAL C KERRICK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
E-MAILED BRIEF
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
E-MAILED BRIEF
_________/s/________________
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas
